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REPLY BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Respondents state in their conclusion that the
trial of this matter resulted in a fair hearing to all
parties; that appellants went to the jury with limited
residential land use as the theory of their case and
Yalue based thereon; and that this was a decision of
their own making, a choice made in litigation which
cannot be now abandoned or recanted.
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It is clearly evident from the record of this case
that the statement of respondent is not true, appellants were not permitted to develop their theory of
the case and therefore appellants did not have a fair
hearing of the case.
It is felt this brief is made necessary because
of a different position taken by respondent on the
law in its appeal brief from that taken at the trial
and an unwarranted interpretation of appellants''
evidence at the trial.
POINT I
DEFENDANTS WERE D E N IE D THE
RIGHT TO PUT ON ANY EVIDENCE RELATING TO PROBABLE REZONING OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Plaintiff in its answering brief takes the position that excerpts taken from the transcript by appellants relating to objections and rulings on the
subject of possible rezoning of the condemned properties were "out of context," (Br. 18) and that "no
foundation of probability" of rezoning was laid. (Br.
23) However, no effort was made to show wherein
the quoted material was out of context. Appellants
contend that the entire trial was "out of context" in
a very real sense because the quoted excerpts are but
a few of many similar quotes, as will be hereinafter
pointed out, that constitute the rule, rather than the
exception, of the nature of the obstacles placed in the
road of the landowners' case.
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In plaintiff's brief objecting to appellants' Motion for New Trial, plaintiff took a somewhat different position from that taken in its brief before this
Court as is evidenced by the following quote :
Even were it proposed (which plaintiff wholly
resists) that a probability of future zoning
change may be evidenced in an imminent domain trial, ... (Italics added) (R. 145)
The words "which plaintiff wholly resists"
confirms the fact that plaintiff proposed, and
the Court adopted, the trial theory that evidence
tending to show probability of future zoning was inadmissible. However, in its brief plaintiff now recognizes and admits (Br. 22 and 23) that there is
such an exception to the general rule, but that the
saving factor which plaintiff can now assert is the
claim that there was no "foundation" of a probability of rezoning.
In plaintiff's brief on the Motion for New Trial
which plaintiff filed with Judge Day (R. 137) it
was stated that "the testimony of William F. Bell
based upon the proffer of defendants was not admissible and its exclusion was proper," and, further,
that "it was the decision of the court at the trial ...
that the proffered testimony of Bell, golf course
~rchitect, could not be received as bearing on any
Issue before the trier of fact." The basis suggested
was two-fold:
Zoning regulations of the subject tract, on the
date of assessment of value did not permit
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and recognize such proscribed use ...
The foregoing statements are significant because plaintiff herein recognizes that a proffer of
proof was made and, further, that the Court actually
ruled that zoning regulations on the subject tract
controlled any use to which it could be put for the
purpose of determining highest and best use, and
value, in the trial of the matter. Certainly, this indicates that it was .plaintiff's own version of what the
Court did.
Coming back to the matter of what counsel for
plaintiff contends to be a failure on the part of the
landowners to lay a "foundation" tending to show
a probability of rezoning, let us examine counsel's
argument more closely.. Plaintiff did not suggest how
one should go about laying such a "foundation" or
just wherein the proffers of proof or excluded testimony failed to measure up to this so-called lack of
"foundation." And, in view of the objections raised
to any testimony along the lines tending to show a
probability of rezoning, it is submitted that plaintiff
did not define or explain its contention. As a practical matter, to give real meaning to the word "foundation" tending to establish a probability of rezoning,
it is evident that it was the attempt by the landowners to lay such a foundation which was the very
thing objected· to repeatedly at every stage of the
trial by plaintiff.
.
The landowners offered to put on evidence of
the needs and requirements of the. community and
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of the tourists and new settlers coming into the area;
and the likelihood that a community would rezone
in order to attract new settlers and industry; and
the consideration of proximity to existing communities and the available water supply, good lands and
soils and scenery; and the fact that spot-zoning and
zoning changes were made immediately to the west
of the subject property in Middleton; and similar
conditions. If such evidence fails to lay a "foundation," then the question is, just what kind of evidence
could be introduced? Further, if a proffer of proof
(as spelled out in its entirety on pages 19-20 of defendants' prior brief), wherein an offer was made
to bring the city officials before the court to prove
that the zoning would be removed, and had been considered before the condemnation took place, and that
it was removed shortly after the taking became effective - as revealed from the minutes of the Washington City Council meeting, do not come up to the standards of such a "foundation," then it can be said that
one lays such a "foundation" only when the zoning
has in fact been changed And that is what plaintiff
is really saying in its brief.
Plaintiff's position on the matter of laying a
"foundation," is not the law. The quoted cases in
the landowners' brief to the effect that a probability
of rezoning can be shown from a variety of factors
and that an appraiser can consider all of those fac~ors, even without bringing affected public officials
~nto court to indicate what they may or may not do
if the matter is presented, are so numerous and so
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greatly in favor of the landowners' position that
plaintiff cannot meet them head-on. Nor has plaintiff tried to meet the law of those cases except by the
unsupported smoke-screen approach of lack of "foundation."
From prior quoted excerpts from the Court's
rulings and plaintiff's objections to testimony, it is
clear that the Court was excluding any and all references to a probability of re-zoning, no matter how
the issue might come up. The comments on the part
of the Court and opposing counsel which are set
forth below show that the Court excluded everything
on the subject, including that which opposing counsel
would, without definition, classify as "foundation"
material:
THE COURT:
I don't think you people can present evidence
here, and I am going to stop you, which will
show an illegal or improper use of these premises under the law.... (Tr. 63)

* * * *
MR. CAMPBELL:
... but let it be well known that it is the position of the State of Utah in the case that any
proposed testimony or any statement relative
to any other use than the- that w~s reco~
nized and permitted under the zoning ordinance at the time of condemnation are inadmissible. . . . (Italics added) ( Tr. 103-104)
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* *

* *

THE COURT:
The fact of the matter is on September 20,
which is the date we are concerned with, nothing had happened. It was not annexed to
Washington City; and my thinking on that
is it is irrelevant. (Tr. 133)

* * * *
THE COURT:
. . . and my ruling will hold with regard to
your proffer on the possibility of rezoning it
will stand. (Tr. 166)
*

*

*

*

MR. CAMPBELL:
We feel that it is purely speculative and conjectural to receive evidence with respect to
whether or not the County Zoning Commission and the County Commissioners themselves may at some time in the future rezone
the property....
*

*

*

*

MR. CAMPBELL:
So we look at this property through this view
that existed the date the service of summons
was made on the property, and whatever happened to this property by way of annexation,
by way of zoning change, would be particularly irrelevant ... (Tr. 36)
*

*

*

*

MR. FULLER:
Before Mr. Campbell answers, I would like
to speak to one other issue that is before the
Court that Mr. Campbell raised; and I don't
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believe that it is in his Brief. It goes to the
question of whether we are frozen, so to speak,
with the zoning that existed at the time of
condemnation. (Tr. 32)
What Plaintiff is saying when it argues that a
"foundation" must be laid, is, in reality, a bald statement that no use can be shown for a property unless
zoning is actually then in effect permitting such a
use. This is made completely clear by further statements taken from the transcript:
MR. CAMPBELL:
We have to assess this property in his answer
as it was situated with all benefits and all
detriments on it as it was on September 20,
1962; and I think as to what Washington
County might do- I mean- whether Washington City might make an annexation on September 21 of 1962 or 1963, or 1970 is of no
concern to us in determining what the value
of the property was on September 20, 1963.
(Italics added) (Tr. 132)

Question put to Mr. Kiepe:
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Did you consider that this
property did or did not have any value for
construction of dwellings at that time?
MR. CAMPBELL:
Well, now your Honor, we are going to object
to that. In the first place, it is leading and
suggestive and calls for an answer that any
fool can plainly see, and secondly it hasn't
been established by foundation- well, I think
that would be proper - there is no foundation
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for the question until we establish what the
permitted and recognized use of that land was
as of the date of condemnation. Once we get
that, then we can establish the highest and
best ... (Italics added) (Tr. 134)

* * * *
When an attorney, through objections which
are in turn sustained by the Court defeats a party's
attempts to lay a foundation and· to put in evidence
of "probable rezoning" and of actual proof that rezoning was contemplated and did in fact come about
within a short time, he cannot now rely on lack of
foundation being laid.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS' APPRAISER DID NOT APPRAISE THE CONDEMNED PROPERTIES FOR
ANY USAGE OTHER THAN FOR COMMERCIAL AND SUBDIVISION PURPOSES.
On page 25 of plaintiff's ·brief it is contended
that the appraiser for defendants, Werner Kiepe,
appraised the condemned lands for purposes other
than for commercial and subdivision uses, and that
his appraisal was based on a use tied to "limited residential use tied to small farm acreages." To the contrary, Mr. Kiepe was emphatic in his statements
that such was not the highest and best use of the
condemned properties, and counsel for. plaintiff cut
off every attempt by Mr. Kiepe to develop his opinion
that commercial and residential uses constituted the
basis for his valuation.
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Since the transcript itself is much more persuasive than unsupported arguments of opposing
counsel having no foundation in evidence, a look at
the record is, we think, the answer:

Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Well, now, Mr. Kiepe, did
you give any consideration to the possibility
that semi-retired persons may locate in this
area on what would be classified as a small
farm of two or three acres with a dwelling
on it?
A. Well, I think that's a potential; and I would
assume that it might be, thought I would say
that that's the exception rather than the rule.
Q. In your opinion, could this property have
been sold for that type of usage?
A. Oh, it could have been sold for that.
Q. Did you consider that the highest and best
use of this property was for agricultural use?
By that I mean crop farming and raising of
livestock?
A. No.
Q. And what did you conclude as to that type
of usage?
A. Well, I think it is definitely- when it's
used, it is going to be used for commercial-

MR. CAMPBELL:
Now if the Court please, we are going to object to that, Your Honor for the same grounds;
and I think counsel is trying to do indirectly
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what the Court has said repeatedly cannot be
done directly. (Tr. 214-215)
The simple fact of the matter is that Mr. Campbell repeatedly objected to Mr. Kiepe giving testimony as to any highest and best use of the properties
involved other than that which was specifically permitted under the existing zoning ordinances in effect
at the time of taking. After sustaining Mr. Campbell's objection, the Court stated that it was concerned with the property "as of last September"
(Tr. 216), to which defendants answered:
MR. FULLER:
That is what we are attempting to determine,
your Honor, its highest and best use. (Tr. 216)

The following testimony was the total of defendants' evidence which was received during the
entire trial - and probably only because no objection was made by counsel for plaintiff.

Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Mr. Kiepe, I will ask you
this question: Do you have an opinion as to
what a well-informed purchaser and a wellinformed buyer, that is, the fair market value
of this land, what they would agree as to the
market value of the area in green, that is, the
33.4 7 acres, do you have an opinion as to the
value that piece of property would have had
on the market at the time in view of the zoning that was then in effect?
A. Yes.
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Q. And what is your opinion as to the value
of that property as of that time?
A. My opinion is that it was worth $67,000.00,
which is approximately the rate of $2,000.00
per acre. (Tr. 216)
For plaintiff to suggest that Mr. Kiepe had
departed from his opinion of the highest and best
use of the property of the date of taking, so as to
substitute a lesser use of the properties in place of
what he considered their highest and best use for
residential and commercial purposes is simply to
read into the testimony a convenient argument. It
is quite true that the question put to Mr. Kiepe considered the zoning that was then in effect, but Mr.
Kiepe gave his value to the land for residential and
commercial usage despite the zoning restriction,
since he considered the zoning carried little weight
in his appraisal for the reason that the likelihood of
re-zoning was very probable. The question asked did
not tie values to uses actually permitted under the
existing zoning.
On page 29 of defendants' brief, Mr. Kiepe's
views on the zoning have been set out, exactly as he
gave them at the trial. His statements there indicate
that he recognized the zoning that was in effect, that
it could be changed, and that it did not preclude consideration of other uses for the properties.
Mr. Kiepe made it completely clear (Tr. 210)
that he considered the subject property, because of
trends in the area and elsewhere, to be adaptable as
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a settlement for retired people and for commercial
recreational and residential purposes, and that a
buyer coming into the area "would certainly give
great consideration to that potential." Obviously, Mr.
Kiepe was viewing the value of the property from
the standpoint of a well-informed purchaser having
knowledge of facts and conditions totally unrelated
to small farms or other agricultural uses. This is
quite clear from the type of objection which was
made to restrict further testimony along those lines :
MR. CAMPBELL:
Excuse me, Mr. Kiepe, if the Court please,
I'm going to object to any further testimony
along this line on the ground and for the reason as has been stated heretofore and secondly that this witness is apparently looking into
a crystal ball and telling us what he feels this
area is going to do in the future or is not going
to do in the future; and we are talking about
market value of this subject property in September of 1962, with those restrictions on its
use at that time. (Tr. 210)

Further examination of Mr. Kiepe:
THE WITNESS:
I think that the Southern Utah area has a
potential of developing exactly the same type
of retired, cities and towns of subdivision for
retireds that they have in other places.
Q. (Mr. Fuller) When you speak of Southern
Utah, to what extent do you refer to this St.
George area?
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A. I think specifically close to the St. George
area. I have personally visited a number of
new settlers in Washington and found they
were people who had bought and who were
building because they had retired from their
homes and were moving into this area. They
were in some cases Latter-day Saints who
were interested in the St. George Temple. So
this is a potential. This is definitely an advantage here.
Q. Now, Mr. Kiepe, from the standpoint of the
subject property, to what extent did you feel
that it might be adaptable for this special type
of settler that might come in wanting a home
or a small acreage or whatever it would be.

MR. CAMPBELL:
If the Court please, may I voir dire and make
an objection?
THE COURT:
Yes, if it is a voir dire, you may.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. CAMPBELL:

Q. Mr. Kiepe, at the time you made your appraisal - by the way, what time was that
when you made your appraisal?
A. I was down here in November, 1962.
Q. Did you ever see the property, subject property, before the State had commenced work
on it?
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A. Yes, there was no work done on it by that
time.
Q. And at that time, at the time you saw it
and at the time you're assessing value of this
property, are you a ware of what the zoning
regulations were on the property?
A. Yes.
Q. And that zoning called for agricultural
uses, isn't that correct?
A. It is zoned for agricultural under the zoning -let's put it differently. It is zoned under
the agricultural classification.
Q. And that zoning - have you read a copy
of the zoning ordinances, by the way?
A. I have.
Q. And had you read them before you made
your appraisal?
A. No.
Q. No, you hadn't. ButA. Wait a minute.
Q. But the zoningA. You said zoning ordinance appraisal, I
made it in connection with the appraisal. I
had no occasion to read the zoning ordinance
before this appraisal.
Q. Well, before you finally made your final
conclusionA. I made some inquiries about the zoning
and knew what it was. I hadn't read it, no.
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Q. And that zone limited the use of these properties, of this property as the area that the
State seeks to acquire, for agricultural use
isn't that correct, things incident to agricul:
ture, isn't that right?
A. That is rightQ. Isn't that right, yes or no?
A. Partially right.
MR. CAMPBELL:
Then, if the Court please, we ask that this
witness confine himself to testifying with rel31tionship to the uses that can be placed on this
property, and that this property is naturally
adapted to under those regluations existing at
that time. (Italics added) (Tr. 211-212-213)

* * * *
After further objections and disruptions in the
proceedings, the matter got back to the direct examination of Mr. Kiepe.
MR. FULLER:
Now would you permit us to go into the investigation that he made and the consideration he gave to any possibility of rezoning or
do you wish to exclude us on that? (Italics
added)
THE COURT:
Well, he's already stated that he gave consideration to that. It appears to me, Mr. Fuller, that, sure, there is a possibility. There
may be even a probability; but the fact of the
matter is, it hadn't been accomplished. It
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seems to me we are bound by the facts and
circumstances as they then were. We are concerned with the land as it was then and as it
was then classified. Any other use at that
time, it appears to me, would be illegal and
improper. The objection is sustained. ( Tr.
214)
To prevent a witness having the high qualifications and reputation of Werner Kiepe from developing his analysis of the highest and best use of the
condemned properties as of the date of taking so as
to justify his valuation figures, to prohibit all evidence- whether it be termed as "foundation" evidence or otherwise, relating to re-zoning or removal
of zoning restrictions by annexation to Washington
City and to deny defendants all opportunity of putting in evidence as to uses under the zoning ordinances then existing can not justify plaintiff coming before this court, as stated on page 25 of its brief,
and saying:
"Appellants' have had their day in Court; ... "
Curiously, although plaintiff's trial brief follows in most part the same brief which was submitted to Judge Day in Plaintiff's objection to de-·
fendant's motion for new trial, it would appear that
plaintiff should have included the same reference
in the brief before this Court that was made in the
brief before Judge Day (R. 146) where it was
argued:
Kiepe had full occasion to elucidate his opinion
on highest and best use and value which he
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so did; that the jury rejected such testimony
cannot serve as a basis for a new trial. ( R.
146)
When the Oourt gave Instruction No. 16 to the
Jury (to which exception was properly taken Tr.
441) , the door was closed and the jury had no choice
but to ignore all references to uses of the subject
property other than those actually permitted under
zoning ordinances then in existence.
The herein quoted material certainly is, we
think, conclusive. Further reference to the transcript
by the Court will reveal the fact that the atmosphere
at the trial was at all other times equally adverse
to the landowners.
CONCLUSION
These defendants' "day in Court" consisted really of three or four days of futile attempts to present
a bare shell of a case which might go to a jury as
to the damages to which they were entitled to recover
on the basis of the highest and best use of their properties. Defendant's efforts were rejected at every
turn by the Court. And, ironically the objections of
plaintiff's counsel repeatedly made which were more
in the nature of arguments, rather than objections,
served as a suitable prelude to Instruction No. 16
which gave the jury no choice but to grant judgment
in favor of plaintiff upon values limited to uses actually permitted under the zoning restrictions in effect at the time of the condemnation.
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It is submitted that the interests of justice can
only be served by granting a new trial. Whether the
jury may see fit to again award $16,000.00 or perhaps an even lesser figure, is totally immaterial. A
landowner brought into Court in a condemnation suit
is certainly entitled to at least a fair opportunity to
present testimony and other evidence tending to establish land values. If the testimony and evidence
is weak or unsupported then, certainly, the jury can
carefully weigh that evidence which is admitted, and
decide accordingly. But to deny such right is to abort
justice.
There is another unusual situation presented by
the nature of a condemnation matter which some of
our Utah courts have apparently overlooked in their
analysis of this important type of litigation which
has developed along with projects of "progress," and
it deserves careful consideration. A property owner
is brought into court in a condemnation case as a defendant and against his wishes. Yet, in this unwanted position, he bears the burden of proof on
damages. This situation, and problem, may consist
of a few words in a sentence to the average reader
- until he finds his property is being condemned.
And then the bitter realization strikes home that one
of the most precious rights in America- the right
to own private property, is being riddled under the
guise of public necessity.
And in the process he must pay for qualified

appraisers and legal counsel to compete with governmental agencies which are armed to the hilt with
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experts and unlimited resources for battling the
small landowners, who did not want to sell in the
first place, in the hope of getting "just compensation" for his lands taken and possible damage to his .
remaining lands.
A new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
M. V. BACKMAN of Backman,
Backman & Clark,
1111 Deseret Building
GLEN E. FULLER,
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for appellants
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